Results Matter: Three Case Studies Comparing and Contrasting PFFM and HazOp PHA Reviews by MacGregor, Rosalynn J.
 
 
Results Matter:  Three Case Studies Comparing and Contrasting PFFM and 
HazOp PHA Reviews 
 
R.J. MacGregor, President & Chief Engineer, Sapphire Engineering Services Ltd., 
880 Alexander Road, Enderby, British Columbia, Canada V0E 1V3 
 
Abstract:  Complete, thorough, and correct process safety management 
depends to a large extent on complete, thorough, and correct process hazard 
identification, both before and during the process hazards analysis (PHA) 
review.  Findings from the examination of incidents and disasters in industry 
indicate that PHA reviews fail to identify a significant number of process 
hazards.  This is unacceptable:  we cannot manage a hazard if we don’t know 
that it exists, and incidents will continue to occur if PHA reviews continue to 
overlook process hazards. 
HAZOP is widely recognized as the standard for conducting thorough PHA 
reviews, but it is not the only technique available.  In this paper, outcomes of 
three actual HAZOP reviews in the oil & gas industry are compared and 
contrasted with the results for the same facilities using Process Flow Failure 
Modes (PFFM).  PFFM is a unique method, best described as a highly efficient, 
highly effective cross between FMEA and HAZOP, enhanced by a customized 
visual tool.  Differences in the success rate of the two methodologies to identify 
process hazards are quantified and discussed with the aim of improving the 
industry success rate in identifying process hazards during PHA reviews in a 
cost-effective, straightforward manner. 
Keywords:  Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies; Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA); Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major goals of a Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) review is to identify process hazards.  
For identified process hazards, safeguards (i.e. protective devices and/or practices) are then listed 
and recommendations are made when necessary. However, analysis of industrial disasters in the 
U.S. between 1998 and 2008 shows that one of the main contributing factors in those disasters was 
the failure to identify that the hazard existed in the first place.  The sustained rate and severity of 
process safety incidents in the past decade demonstrate that PHA reviews are still leaving process 
hazards unidentified.  This is unacceptable:  We cannot manage a hazard if we don’t know that it 
exists. 
The Hazards and Operability Review method (HAZOP) is widely recognized as the standard for 
conducting thorough PHA reviews, but it frequently fails to identify process hazards.  This is 
usually blamed on an inexperienced facilitator, lack of management support to the review team or 
meeting, and so forth.  It is rarely blamed on the method itself, implying that the method itself is 
without fault and that there is no better way to conduct a PHA review. 
In this paper, three separate HAZOP reviews are analyzed and categorized, expanding upon 
previous work (MacGregor, 2012).  These are actual reviews for actual facilities, and the 
companies who commissioned the reviews were satisfied with the results.  The results of the 
HAZOP reviews are compared with an analysis of the same facilities using PFFM.  Comparing 
the two methods proves that PFFM is superior to HAZOP in identifying process hazards, in less 
time and with less stress on meeting participants. 
2. The Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) Review 
Essentially, a PHA review is a study of a given process scope (pump station, oil well battery, 
process unit, i.e. Crude Unit, Gas Recovery Unit, etc.) to: 
1. Identify process threats to the facility that may lead to an uncontrolled loss of containment 
(LOC) of a hazardous material.  Typically, a LOC is considered to be possible if the 
equipment is taken outside of its design envelope (design pressure (min./max.), design 
temperature (min./max.), or if an atmospheric vessel is flooded (causing a spill to grade), 
or if material is inadvertently released to the atmosphere by incorrect valve operation.  
2. Identify the controls in place to prevent the uncontrolled loss of containment identified in 
step (1):  PSVs (pressure safety valves), alarms, automatic trips or shutdowns, operating 
procedures, etc. 
3. Decide whether the controls in place are adequate to control the risks, and if they aren’t, to 
make recommendations to improve them. 
The purpose of the PHA is to protect people and equipment.  The means of identifying the threats 
that exist is by considering disturbances to the normal operations of the process:  blocking flow, 
changing compositions, power failures, etc. 
The scope of a given review is usually too large to be considered as a whole.  Therefore, it is 
typical to divide the review scope into “nodes”, or “sections”, typically numbered and highlighted 
in different colours.  Disturbances to the nodes or sections of the process facility are then evaluated, 
with the intent that the overall effects of the disturbance will be considered wherever they occur 
(upstream of the node/section, within the node/section, downstream of the node/section, or a 
combination thereof). 
PHA reviews are properly conducted by multidisciplinary teams of individuals who are 
knowledgeable in the process and the equipment in the scope of the review.  Participation by both 
operations and technical people is essential to a successful review. 
3. Setting a Baseline 
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) conducts investigations of selected process safety 
incidents in that country.  Incidents examined that occurred in the U.S. between 1998 and 2008 
(Kaszniak, 2009) are summarized below in terms of the causes of serious process safety incidents: 
• Twenty-one (21) major incidents were studied. 
• The total number of injuries from those incidents was 282. 
• The total number of fatalities from those incidents was 39. 
The data for the property loss and other financial losses from those incidents is not available in the 
report, but it was likely substantial. 
The descriptions of the incidents studied detailed the various types of failures that contributed to 
each incident (Kaszniak, 2009).  Figure 1 displays the number of incidents in which each type of 
failure contributed to an incident.  Several of the incidents had multiple contributing factors.  
Failure to identify credible causes during PHA reviews occurs with the greatest frequency; 
reducing the frequency of this deficiency could save lives and reduce injury frequencies.  Since 
HAZOP is almost the universal method used for PHA review in the U.S. and has been for the past 
thirty-five years, ensuring the ability of HAZOP reviews to identify all credible failure scenarios 
would reduce the number of incidents, fatalities, and injuries in future.  A short foray into Process 
Safety networking websites (for example, Linked In) indicates that this is a formidable challenge 
and that success is elusive and difficult to sustain. 
Another option is simply to adopt a better PHA review technique that has the strength of HAZOP, 
with fewer of its deficiencies—namely, a technique that is significantly better at identifying all 











4. Approach Used for the Case Studies 
The CSB paper (Kaszniak, 2009) examined serious incidents.  But fortunately, serious incidents 
are the exception rather than the rule.  Perhaps their PHA reviews were unusually deficient, and 
the typical HAZOP review done today is much more complete.  To test this, the two PHA 
methodologies were compared for the same three facilities: 
1. A Heavy Oil facility upgrade, involving gas receiving, separation, and compression 
facilities 
2. A Natural Gas well installation 
3. A Delayed Coking Unit 
The two methodologies compared are: 
1. HAZOP 
2. Process Flow Failure Modes 
HAZOP is the most widely-known PHA methodology, typically using these steps: 
• Select a node 
• Describe intention of the node 
• Identify major hazards 
• Apply a deviation (temperature/pressure) 
• Brainstorm possible causes 
• Develop potential consequences 
• Determine the safeguards / barriers 
• Propose recommendations / action items 
• Apply the next deviation in the same way until all deviations have been considered 
• Proceed to the next node 
The scope of the review for a given facility is encompassed by the nodes.  If any of the review 
scope is missing in the nodes identification, this may or may not be obvious to the review team 
when looking at the process and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs).  The deviations are generally 
pre-determined according to the company HAZOP procedure and/or template:  failure to identify 
deviations may or may not be a concern—in fact, too many deviations may also be an issue. 
In PFFM, coloured sections of the facility (similar to nodes) are defined, but the review process 
is slightly different: 
Prior to the meeting: 
• Following the process flow sequentially, disturb the normal process operation by 
failing system components or committing operator errors.  Use these to pre-populate 
the causes for each component in each section 
During the meeting 
• Select a section 
• Consider the pre-populated causes in order of the process flow 
• Develop potential consequences 
• Determine the safeguards / barriers 
• Propose recommendations / action items 
• If pre-population has missed any causes, the team adds the causes in the order of the 
process flow and determines safeguards/barriers and recommendations/action items in 
the same way as for pre-populated causes 
• Proceed to the next section 
PFFM is described in more detail elsewhere (Ego, 2004, and MacGregor, 2013). 
A precursor to identifying all credible failure scenarios is to identify all of the potential causes of 
those failure scenarios.  It is stated above that missed credible failure scenarios was an issue in 
major incidents in the past.  Failure scenarios are in the “consequences” category.  But to identify 
all potential failure scenarios, all potential causes must also be identified.  This is where failures 
can be missed, and it is where the analysis of the case studies has been focused.  
For each case study, the HAZOP review was done first, with a review team in a meeting room, as 
per common practice in industry.  Each HAZOP review meeting had an experienced HAZOP 
facilitator whose method is to examine the facility drawings prior to the review meeting, lay out 
the nodes, and make separate notes on what he views as being the potential hazards and areas that 
need particular attention.  Again, as per common practice, these facilitators did not enter causes 
into the worksheets prior to the review meeting to avoid “leading” the review team and reducing 
participation.  Each review followed the same overall methodology:  a HAZOP deviation 
approach, with 15 “standard” deviations to prompt team thought, risk ranking, and 
recommendations assigned to identifiable individuals.  These reviews relied on facility P&IDs as 
their primary reference drawings. 
To minimize bias and maximize applicability of the findings, the HAZOP reviews selected 
involved: 
• Three individual experienced safety professionals facilitated the reviews, to avoid bias 
due to the preferences/strengths/weaknesses of any one individual 
• Three separate types of oil & gas facilities were selected, designed by separate project 
design teams in separate client firms 
• Three different review teams, with no one individual appearing on any of the other two 
teams 
• Three different client sites with different ownership histories. 
The drawings from each of the three reviews were then used with the Process Flow Failure Modes 
technique.  The drawings with the coloured nodes indicated were used, so that the statistics 
generated could be broken down cleanly between the two methodologies, node by node.  The 
HAZOP worksheets were not opened, to prevent any biasing of the PFFM worksheets with 
information from the HAZOP worksheets.   
First, the PFFM worksheets were pre-populated with causes for all three case studies.  For the Case 
Study #3, a full PHA review was conducted1.  Finally, the worksheets were compared between the 
HAZOP and PFFM methodologies for each case. 
5. The Case Studies 
                                                            
1 This included development of a Safeguarding Flow Diagram (SFD) for Case Study 3, which was used as the 
primary reference drawing in the PFFM review meeting 
One of the frustrations that emerged during this study is the frequency of duplication of line items 
(including causes) that occurs in HAZOP reviews2.  Clients may see a thick pile of worksheets and 
from that assume that there has been a very thorough and systematic review of the facility.  
However, very often there is a lot of duplication of line items in the various deviations in a node.  
There is frequently duplication of line items among several neighbouring nodes as well.  The 
duplicate causes/safeguards/recommendations sets do not compensate for the failure to identify 
missed causes. 
5.1  Case Study 1:  Heavy Oil Facility Infrastructure Upgrade 
The facilities examined in C.S. #1 are fairly simple.  No heat exchangers or rotating equipment is 
involved.  However, H2S is present and flammable gases and liquids are present at elevated 
pressures.  A LOC from this facility could result in one or more fatalities as well as financial losses 
in excess of $1 million Canadian dollars.  The results of the reviews are displayed in Table 1. 
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 TOTAL 62 58 93 93 63% average 
A significant number of unduplicated causes were identified by PFFM as compared with HAZOP.  
These can be grouped into categories: 
• System failure causes:  The HAZOP review included no system failure causes at all 
(pool fire scenarios, loss of power, loss of instrument air, etc.).  Using PFFM, every 
applicable system failure cause is listed 
• In the Gas Handling Piping Node, Node 3, several incoming streams enter the scope of 
the review.  In PFFM, each of these streams is subject to 6 questions:  high/low 
incoming pressure and temperature, and contamination (unwanted phases, composition 
changes) 
                                                            
2 Since PFFM lists each cause only once, by design, there is inherently no duplication of 
cause/safeguard/recommendation line items. 
• In the Gas Handling Piping Node, there are several control valves.  PFFM, properly 
done, asks what happens when the control valve fails open.  It also asks what happens 
if the control valve fails open, with its bypass open, as this can present a hazard not 
previously identified in the design stage, and which does not exist with the control 
valve open alone 
• In the Flare Interface Node, several streams leave the scope of the review.  In PFFM, 
each of these streams has two causes associated:  blocked flow downstream, and 
backflow into the facilities from the downstream unit 
In C.S. #1, five causes were identified in the HAZOP review that could not have been identified 
via PFFM pre-population from P&IDs3.  These five causes dealt with physical equipment 
locations, pigging frequencies, and special maintenance concerns.  The extra items identified in 
the HAZOP review that were not listed in the pre-populated PFFM worksheets were, without 
exception, identifiable only by operations or maintenance personnel from the facility, and therefore 
were not identifiable prior to the review meeting. 
One other observation that can be drawn from C.S. #1 is the trend in the number of causes 
identified.  Early in the HAZOP review meeting, the number of causes identified is nearly on a par 
with the PFFM technique.  However, later in the review, the percentage drops.  One possible reason 
for this is that the team was getting tired and was unable to be as thorough as they were earlier in 
the review.  (HAZOP teams get tired more quickly due to the non-intuitive nature of the HAZOP 
review process (Effect→Cause approach vs Cause→Effect approach used in PFFM.))  Another 
possible reason is that the meeting time was running out, and the team was rushed to complete the 
review.  Perhaps it is a combination of both—either way, the number of causes identified later in 
the review meeting is much lower compared with those generated by PFFM. 
5.2 Case Study 2:  Natural Gas Well Surface Facility 
The facilities examined in C.S. #2 are fairly simple.  Again, no heat exchangers or rotating 
equipment is involved.  However, flammable gases and liquids are present at elevated pressures, 
and the facility feeds a downstream unit that handles sour fluid.  A LOC due to a failure in this 
facility could result in one or more fatalities as well as financial losses of up to $1 million Canadian 
dollars.  The results of the reviews are shown in Table 2.  In every node, the PFFM technique 
identified more potential causes of process hazards; in the first two nodes, more than twice as many 
causes were listed. 
                                                            
3 Resources did not support production of SFDs for C.S. #1 & #2, and the same P&IDs for the facilities that were used for the 
HAZOP reviews were also used for the PFFM worksheets preparation. 
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 TOTAL 72 67 119 119 56% average 
Note 1.  3 items related to maintenance and physical location 
Note 2.  1 item about injection quills for methanol injection points 
Note 3.  1 out of scope item, hail storm, forest fire 
Note 4.  3 items maintenance related or out of scope 
A significant number of unduplicated causes were identified by PFFM as compared with HAZOP.  
These can be grouped into categories: 
• System failure causes:  The HAZOP review included fewer system failure causes (pool 
fire scenario, loss of power, loss of instrument air, etc.).  Using PFFM, every applicable 
system failure cause is listed 
• In the Wellhead Node, Node 1, two incoming streams (well tubing and well casing) 
enter the scope of the review.  In PFFM, each of these streams is subject to 6 questions:  
high/low incoming pressure and temperature, and contamination (unwanted phases, 
composition changes) 
• In Nodes 2 and 3, holding tanks are included.  The Methanol Tank in Node 2 is filled 
by tank truck, while the Produced Water Tank in Node 3 is emptied by tank truck.  In 
PFFM, truck loading/unloading activities entail 8 causes for truck offloading to a tank, 
and 5 questions for truck loading from a tank.  Most of these were not discussed in the 
HAZOP review. 
• There are several piping segments in Node 3 for draining of vessels, level bridles, and 
strainers to the Produced Water Tank.  PFFM follows the process flow, considering 
each failure as it progresses through the drawing.  HAZOP does not, typically, and it 
did not for Case 2.  More general “catch-all” causes were phrased, as is typically the 
case for HAZOP reviews when the size of a node starts to get out of hand. 
The extra items identified in the HAZOP review that were not listed in the pre-populated PFFM 
worksheets were, with three exceptions, identifiable only by operations or maintenance personnel 
from the facility, and therefore not identifiable prior to the review meeting.  The exceptions were: 
1. The HAZOP team recognized that there are no injection quills for the methanol injection 
points.  Presence of design engineers in the review meeting made this identifiable. 
2. Forest fire and hail storm were identified as being potential emergency situations for this 
facility.  Typically, personnel who work at the facility will identify such hazards, based on 
their experiences at that geographical location.  While such items could be listed 
beforehand by the facilitator, PFFM practice so far has been not to pre-populate for them.  
This is because process hazards are not typically influenced by storm or other external 
conditions except with respect to power and utility outages, fire case, blocked flow 
downstream, loss of flow upstream, etc.  Of course, individual client preference can allow 
for pre-population of any number of “non-traditional” causes, as desired, similar to 
HAZOP reviews. 
3. Maintenance or operational concerns related to unique equipment and its physical location. 
In C. S. #2, the HAZOP review showed more consistency in identifying hazards as the nodes 
progressed, which is a difference from the trend in C. S. #1. 
5.3 Case Study 3:  Delayed Coking Unit 
C. S. #3 involved complete HAZOP and PFFM reviews, and therefore more comparing and 
contrasting is possible for this case.  The complexity of the process unit contributes to the validity 
of the findings.  Briefly, a Delayed Coking Unit (DCU) is one in which heavy, thick oil is heated 
in fired heaters to temperatures at which thermal cracking of the large hydrocarbon molecules 
occurs (see schematic, Figure 2).  The hot fluid is carried from the fired heaters to an in-service, 
or on-line, coke drum, where the thermal cracking reactions stop due to cooling by quench oil.  
Thermal cracking forms lighter, more marketable hydrocarbon molecules and coke.  The coke 
settles in the coke drum, while the oil continues through to a fractionation column downstream.  
When the coke drum is full of coke, the drum is taken off line, isolated, cooled, and the coke is 
removed.  DCUs have at least two coke drums in parallel, so that one drum can be on line while 
the other is having the coke removed. 
The DCU studied for this paper included: 
• Two fired heaters, totalling three process stream passes plus two steam superheating 
passes 
• 25 pumps, 11 pressure vessels, 10 heat exchangers 
• Coke drilling and coke removal equipment 
• 6 main coke drum operating modes (each with several steps involving multiple swings 
of switching valves), on a 15-20 hour cycle) 
A HAZOP review was conducted in first, and a PFFM review was conducted at a later date.  Only 
one team member, an operator, was common to both reviews.  The HAZOP was not made available 
to the PFFM review team until most of the PFFM review was complete, and none of it was used 
to influence the PFFM review.  As it happened, the PFFM review covered more scope than the 
HAZOP review.  To enable a direct comparison of the two methods, then, the PFFM review results 
were rearranged into two groups:  (1) matching the HAZOP review scope, and (2) additional scope.  
Then, the material in group (1) was rearranged to match the noding used for the HAZOP review. 
A direct comparison of the findings from the two reviews with matching scopes is displayed in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5.  For the same review scope: 
1. PFFM identified more than twice the number of causes identified by HAZOP 
2. PFFM identified more than 2.5 times the number of consequences identified by HAZOP 
3. PFFM generated over one third more recommendations than were generated in the HAZOP 
review4 
 
Figure 2.  Delayed Coking Unit Schematic 
 
 
                                                            
4 Since the operating company had some time in which to implement the HAZOP review 
recommendations because it was done earlier, there should have been fewer recommendations 
from the PFFM review, not more.  Further, the HAZOP review recommendations contained 
many specific changes to specific valve operations, which were encompassed in a single PFFM 
review recommendation to implement a planned, well defined controls improvement project. 
 
 





























Figure 3.  C.S. #3:  No. of Causes in Each Node 
(Matched Scopes)
HAZOP PFFM
HAZOP Total:    688
PFFM Total:     1470 (2.14X)
 
 





























Figure 4.  C.S. #3: No. of Consequences
in Each Node (Matched Scopes)
HAZOP PFFM
HAZOP Total:  829
PFFM Total:  2097 (2.53 X)
 
An estimate of the review meeting time necessary for the matching scope PFFM review is 10.1 
days; the HAZOP review took 12 days.  (While no such direct comparison was possible for C.S. 
#1 or #2, a similar wellsite review to C.S. #2 was conducted by the author which showed 25% 
savings in review meeting duration using PFFM.) 
Due to the large scope of C.S. #3, it would be onerous to analyse all of the causes in both reviews 
and to compare and contrast these in detail.  However, some general observations can be made 
(these from a review of the first 3½ nodes out of 22).  The HAZOP review: 
1. Failed to consider disturbances in feed streams entering the unit in a systematic way (high 
and low pressure, high and low temperature) 





























Figure 5.  C.S. #3:  No. of Recommendations 
in Each Node (Matched Scopes)
HAZOP PFFM
HAZOP Total:    93
PFFM Total:    125 (1.34X)
2. Included heat supply failure to O’Brien boxes in most nodes as a cause.  Since such failures 
generally result in control valve or other failures, which are already considered in other 
types of causes, this is redundant 
3. Used six different causes for high aerial cooler temperature, with mostly common 
safeguards.  PFFM used two.  In spite of this, the HAZOP missed design temperature issues 
on two overhead drums 
4. Neglected valves and blinds that were incorrectly positioned in the field, since it assumed 
that the P&IDs represented the actual facility (PFFM includes field checking to confirm 
actual positions of manual block valves and blinds, including the positions of locked or car 
sealed valves) 
5. Missed some maintenance isolation concerns 
6. Did not consider pool fire or jet fire scenarios 
7. Missed overheating potential for a shell and tube heat exchanger in the no flow case, as 
well as overpressure risk in the tube rupture case 
8. Missed potential for some pumps to overpressure downstream equipment in blocked flow 
cases 
9. Scope did not cover the entire process unit, and therefore some hazards were missed, such 
as the potential to overpressure turbine steam exhaust lines due to blocked flow and the 
potential to overpressure drain or pumpout lines by incorrect operation of manual block 
valves. 
Because C.S. #3 had complete reviews for both PHA methods, further comparison is possible.  For 
instance, was the higher number of causes posed by PFFM produced a greater number of unique 
causes—or were the causes just paraphrasing each other?  An analysis of the two sets of worksheets 
was done side-by-side, and all causes that were essentially the same in both reviews were deleted.  
What remains is a set of unique causes that were identified by the two reviews  The results are 
shown in Table 3.  Table 4 shows the number of recommendations generated with respect to the 
same analysis. 


































688 1470 47% 95 1024 9.3% 
 
Table 4.  Case Study 3:  Delayed Coker, Total & Unique Recommendations Comparison (for 



































95 123 77% 27 111 24% 
 
Table 4 shows that the unique causes identified by PFFM produced four times as many unique 
recommendations.  Furthermore, at least five of the HAZOP recommendations had become 
obsolete by the time the PFFM review was held, because they had been implemented. 
5.3.1 Additional Scope Reviewed by PFFM for C.S. #3 
The PFFM review covered more scope, as mentioned above.  Since HAZOP uses P&IDs, crowded 
or confusing layouts can result in overlooked scope.  Field checked SFDs are generated for PFFM 
reviews of complex facilities, greatly reducing the likelihood of missed equipment.  Additional 
scope covered in the PFFM review was: 
• Two chemical injection packages + cutting oil (3 nodes) 
• Steam superheaters in Coker Furnaces (2 nodes) 
• Utilities sides of S&T Exchangers (2 nodes) 
• Pump Steam Turbines (1 node + causes in 3 others) 
• Steam Blowdown Drum & Pumps (2 nodes) 
• Reboiler in Blowdown Tower (1 node) 
• Start-up/Recirculation Piping (1 node + causes in 2 others) 
• Coke handling facilities (1 node) 
• Slop Oil header (1 node) 
The results of the additional PFFM reviewed equipment are shown on Figure 6.  A significant 
benefit includes the 29 recommendations that were made.  To cover this additional scope took 1.9 
more days, for a total of 13 review days for the PFFM review versus 12 for the HAZOP review.  
Some of the review recommendations from this additional scope included: 
1. Access to the safety shower could become hazardous if antifoam has been spilled at the 
antifoam skid.  Mitigate 
2. Ensure proper set pressure of chemical skid PSVs to prevent backflow of oil to tote tanks, 
which could cause a flammable spill 
3. Run dedicated flush oil line to antifoam line so that switching valve in flush oil header can 
function as needed to prevent escalation factors in unit (switching valve is part of unit 
emergency isolation system) 
4. Deal with out-of-service steam superheater coils in fired heaters to eliminate associated 
hazards with current configuration 
5. Two recommendations dealing with safe, reliable damper operation on fired heaters 
6. Ensure functionality and correct sizing of PSV on cooling water side of a process 
exchanger 
7. Address potential personnel burn hazard from current steam blowdown valve vent 
configuration 
8. Several recommendations to address potential to cross-contaminate two separate slop 
systems, which could cause tank failure and LOC hot, flammable, sour fluid 
9. Installation of start-up bypass around a high pressure steam isolation valve 
None of these recommendations is superfluous, and their value is readily apparent.  What is a 





The data from the CSB paper (Kaszniak, 2009) makes it clear that the failure to identify credible 
failure scenarios can result in very serious consequences, and that credible failure scenarios are 
sometimes missed during PHA reviews.  Failure scenarios are in the “Consequences” category, 
and to identify all potential failure scenarios, all potential causes must also be identified.  This is 
where failures can be missed, and it is where the analysis of the case studies was focused.  
The CSB paper (Kaszniak, 2009) examined serious incidents.  Given the data shown above, and 
below in Table 5, the PHA reviews involved in the CSB paper incidents were not unusually 
deficient, and the typical HAZOP review done today not much more complete. 




























Sum # Causes:  425
Sum # Consequences:  524
Sum # Recommendations: 29



























1 62 58 93 93 67% 
2 72 67 119 119 61% 
3 688 n/a 1470 n/a 47% 
TOTAL 822 n/a 1682 n/a 49%(weighted) 
 
Why did the HAZOP reviews fail to identify all the causes—and, therefore, all of the potential 
hazards?  Analysis of the differences in the case studies shows: 
• Shortcutting of the HAZOP methodology—fire case is not considered at all in two of 
these reviews 
• Shortcutting of the HAZOP methodology—feed stream hazards due to high/low 
pressure or high/low temperature were not included in one of the reviews 
• Shortcutting of the HAZOP methodology—the assumption in the reviews is that, since 
the failure of rotating equipment and control/isolation valve failures have been 
individually considered, the power failure case (or instrument air case, as appropriate) 
has been covered.  This is not so, because instrument air failure can cause multiple 
valves to fail, while power failures can cause multiple pumps, certain types of valves, 
and electric heat tracing to fail simultaneously 
• Lack of systematic consideration of manual block valves being in the wrong position 
in even moderately complex piping arrangements—HAZOP methodology inherently 
makes these failure cases difficult to visualize, describe, and fit into a given deviation 
• The assumption in HAZOP that all locked or car sealed valves and blinds will be in the 
positions indicated on the P&IDs causes some hazards to be missed.  Operators in the 
HAZOP review may not raise the fact that the P&ID is incorrect in a given case because 
they are unsure themselves, or they have the impression that it is unimportant because 
other (possibly inadequate) safeguards exist, or because they are confused about which 
exact valve or blind the team is currently discussing 
• Tendency to move the meeting on from the analysis of a given deviation or cause before 
all credible causes or consequences have been identified—this is worse for HAZOP 
because HAZOP teams get tired more quickly (common example:  overheating of 
drums or cold sides of exchangers, once overpressure and blocked flow hazards 
identified) 
• Following the deviation approach, the teams came up with complicated causes to fit 
the deviations.  Simple failure scenarios (i.e. stuck open check valves, a single pump 
failure) are missed in the confusion. 
• Use of complex P&IDs for noding and analysis, resulting in missed equipment & 
piping, missed high/low pressure interfaces, and in missed hazards 
 
Table 6.  Potential Serious Missed Causes (Annually, for One Facilitator)  
Description Value Calculation Result 
# Causes in all reviews by one 
facilitator in one year 
63795 n/a 6379 
Average Annual Causes 
Missed by HAZOP vs PFFM 
51% (from Table 5 
above) 
0.51*6379 3253.3 
Average Annual Missed 
Causes that Could Result in 
LOC (est.)  
10% (estimated) 0.10*3253.3 325.3 
Average Annual Missed LOC 
Causes Without Adequate 
Safeguards 
10% (estimated) 0.10*325.3 32.5 
 
Table 6 applies the results of the HAZOP/PFFM case study comparisons to one facilitator’s year’s 
reviews:  32.5 unidentified serious incidents could be lurking in these facilities, any one of which 
could occur while those facilities are in operation—for only one facilitator, for only one year.  
When the number of facilitators involved in HAZOP reviews, world-wide, every year, is 
considered, there is enormous potential for damage and loss of life.  It is no wonder, therefore, that 
incidents continue to occur.  
7. Conclusion 
Findings from the examination of incidents and disasters in industry indicate that not all process 
hazards are recognized during PHA reviews—in fact, failure to recognise that a hazard existed was 
the most common cause of major incidents (Kazniak, 2009).  This is a compelling case for change:  
we cannot manage a hazard if we don’t know that it exists, and PHA review teams must make 
every reasonable effort to identify all process hazards—even those that are not easy to discern. 
In these case studies, outcomes of three actual HAZOP reviews in the oil & gas industry have been 
compared with the results of Process Flow Failure Modes (PFFM), a “cold eyes” structured what-
if examination method.  For the same facilities, PFFM identified a weighted average of twice as 
many causes as the HAZOP review meetings did, and therefore was able to identify far more 
potential hazards.  Case Study #3 was the most direct comparison between the two methods, and 
showed approximately 15% savings in review meeting duration when PFFM was used, while at 
the same time delivering better results.  The more complex the facility, the more superior were the 
PFFM results.  Surely, this is compelling evidence for incorporating the PFFM technique into all 
of our PHA reviews going forward. 
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